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production inefficiencies.
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1  Introduction
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) have proved that when costless lump-sum transfers are not
feasible production efficiency is still desirable, although the conditions for Pareto-
efficiency are not attainable
1. This theorem has had a considerable influence on decision-
making at both national and international levels of government. The scope of potential
application of the theorem should be gauged from the fact that it not only suggests that a
government should not interfere in the allocation of resources between production
sectors, but also, by considering the foreign sector as a production sector, that it should
not interfere with external trade either. However, the assumptions that need to hold for
the theorem to be valid, that tax rates on all market transactions and on pure profit can be
fixed at their optimal levels at no cost, are very restrictive, as has been pointed out from
the outset by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971).
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the costs involved in tax administration
are likely to invalidate the assumptions on which the efficiency theorem is based and may
thus imply that optimal commodity taxation requires differentiation of tax rates between
production sectors, i.e. that production efficiency is not desirable.
Existing tax structures reflect the importance of administrative costs. The widespread use
of uniform tax rates for large groups of commodities reflects that the administrative costs
of such tax structures are lower than when tax rates are differentiated. That governments
in general
2 tax different types of labour income according to a common schedule
undoubtedly reflect the significant administrative costs which are involved in
differentiating the taxation of labour income according to differences in skill levels.
However, although it has been recognised as a serious weakness (see e.g. Sandmo 2000
p119), little work has been done to integrate administrative costs in optimal tax theory.
Taking the administrative costs into account is therefore an endeavour with the potential
to enhance considerably the relevance of optimal tax theory for policy analysis. The
implication of government not being able to observe differences in skill levels has been
extensively analysed in the context of optimal income taxation, but it seems that the
implication for production efficiency within an optimal commodity tax framework has
not been seriously investigated (see e.g. Boadway 1995).
The implications of restrictions on the set of feasible tax instruments for optimal
commodity taxation have been investigated by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Dasgupta
and Stiglitz (1972) and Munk (1980), adopting a framework with one representative
                                                
1 Strictly speaking, the theorem only claims that production efficiency outside the household sector, i.e. in
production sectors transforming marketed commodities, is desirable. Since the optimal tax system requires
the rates of transformation within the household sector to be different from those within the production
sectors transforming marketed commodities, when comparing household production with production in the
sectors transforming marketed commodities, production efficiency is clearly not desirable.
2 The progress in information technology in recent years may have reduced the costs of tax schemes to
benefit low-skilled workers to the point where they are administratively feasible.2
household and taking as given that certain tax instruments could not be used. We extend
and deepen the analysis by providing an explanation in terms of administrative costs for
the restrictions on the government’s choice of tax rates, effectively making these
restrictions endogenous. Furthermore, we consider a many household economy. This
turns out to be crucial for bringing out the policy implications of taking administrative
costs into account. We assume constant returns to scale in order to bypass the
complications of having to interpret rules of normalisation in the presence of pure profit,
and to show that untaxed profit is not the main reason why production efficiency may not
be desirable
3.
We represent administrative costs as depending on tax structures, but not on the level of
taxation, assuming that a differentiated tax structure is associated with higher
administrative costs than a corresponding non-differentiated tax structure
4. This involves
a significant simplification, however a simplification that may be justified in a similar
way as assuming that the use of lump-sum transfers to raise tax revenue and to
redistribute income is not available to the government. The assumption that lump-sum
transfers are not possible may be justified by essentially the same reasons that taxation of
labour income according to differences in skill levels is not possible (see Atkinson and
Stiglitz 1980, p357)
5. As the first assumption invalidates the Second Theorem of welfare
economics as a basis for providing policy advice, so do the second compromise the
policy relevance of the Efficiency Theorem. Both assumptions are crude ways to
represent the difficulties of observing the household characteristics required for income
redistribution, but nevertheless serve as the basis for obtaining important insights.
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 the model is formulated. In Section 3 we
consider the conditions for a tax system to be optimal, taking into account the
administrative costs of alternative tax structures. In Section 4 we identify cases where
administrative costs may provide a justification for differentiating the taxation of primary
factors between production sectors and thus for production inefficiency, and provide a
quantitative illustration of the theoretical analysis using a stylised CGE model. In a final
section we highlight some implications of the results for policy analysis.
2  The model
The model considered involves the government choosing commodity and primary factor
taxes and a uniform lump-sum transfer
6 to maximise a Pareto social welfare function
                                                
3 Myles (1995) on the subject of production efficiency (with reference to Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1972) only
mention that productive efficiency is not desirable when profit cannot be taxed at 100%.
4 We thus make only a very limited contribution to explaining the mix of direct and indirect taxes (see
Boadway 1995).
5 They write: "The basic difficulty is [..] that the information on which we would like to base differential
lump-sum taxes is not observable, or observable only at great cost, and individuals have an incentive not to
reveal it. For these reasons, lump-sum taxes and transfers are widely assumed not to be available."
6  This allows income taxation within the framework to be represented by a linear income tax.3
consistent with egalitarian value judgements, subject to constraints representing the
structure of the economy, including the administrative costs of taxation.
In the economy, there are N constant returns to scale production sectors, H households
labelled h ˛(1,..,H) and a government labelled G. The primary factors are labelled
j˛(1,..,M), the produced commodities i ˛(M+1,..,M+N) and the production sectors k˛
(1,..,N). We denote the index set of households, H, of primary factors, F, of produced
commodities, C, and of production sectors, A.
The h
th household's supply of primary factors and demand for final commodities is
denoted  ( )
h h
1 z , z M ..., ”
h z  and  ( )
h h ,...,x x N M 1 M + + ”
h x , respectively. The government's
resource requirements is  { }”
G G x z , ( )
G G G G
1 .,x x ,..z z N M 1 M M, + + ,
The households face prices  ( ) M ...,w , w1 ” w  for primary factors, and  ( ) N M 1 M + + ” ,...,q q q
for produced commodities. The h
th household's indirect utility function is  ( )
h V I
h q,w, ,
and the corresponding expenditure function  ) , ( E
h h u w, q .
Firms maximise profit under conditions of perfect competition and constant returns to
scale. 
k Y  is the output of sector k, and  ( )
k k
1
k v , v M ..., ” v  the use of primary factors in that
sector. Output prices are  ( )
k k
M c p = + k p , k˛A, where  ( )
k k c p  is the unit cost function in
sector k, and  ( )
k k
1
k p , p M ..., ” p  the input prices. The output contingent primary factor
input demands are  ( )
k k k
j Y a p =
k
j v , j ˛F, k ˛A, where  ( )
kk
jj a=a
k p , j ˛F, k ˛A are the
technical coefficients.
Tax rates are defined relative to market prices,  ( ) N M+ ” ,...,p p1 p . The market prices for
primary factors,  ( ) M ..., p , p1 , are defined to be equal to the corresponding producer prices
in sector N. Market prices of produced commodities are defined to be equal to output
producer prices in the corresponding production sectors, i.e.  ( ) N M 1 M + + ,...,p p . We assume
as a matter of normalisation that  1 p =1.
The government can levy a number of different taxes: household taxes,  ( ) N M 1 M + + ,...,t t , on
the consumption of produced commodities, and,  ( ) M ...,s , s1 , on the supply of primary
factors; producer taxes on the use of primary factors in the different production sectors,
1M (,...,)
kk tt ,  A k ˛ ; and a uniform lump-sum tax, L.
7 The level of taxation may for the
consumption of produced commodities be expressed by ratios between household prices
and market prices,
i i i p q T / ” = i i i p p t / ) ( + i˛C
                                                
7 Thus, unearned income is for all households equal to the uniform lump-sum tax, i.e. 
h I =-L. L is negative
if it is interpreted as the fixed element in a progressive linear income tax schedule.4
for supplies of primary factors by ratios between market prices and household prices,
j j j w p S / ” = ) /( j j j s p p - j˛F
and for the use of primary factors in the different production sectors by ratios between




k p p T
j / ” = j j
k
j p p t / ) ( + k˛A  j˛F
We define a tax system as  ( ) ,, (,kA), L
k x ”˛ STT , where ( ) N M 1 M + + ” ,...,T T T ,
( ) M 1 S , S ..., ” S , and  ) ,..., ( M 1
k k k T T ” T , A ˛ k , and assume that different tax systems may
be associated with different administrative costs depending on their complexity. The tax
revue required to finance the government’s expenditures, B”p{ }
G G x z , , is therefore a
function of the tax system, i.e. B =B(x). We assume that B(x) is homogeneous of degree
1 in  p  and  L.  A tax structure 
ii x ˛Î  is a set of tax systems imposing the same
restrictions on the feasible set of tax rates, and which are associated with the same
administrative costs.
We assume that the government solves its maximisation problem in a two-step procedure.
The government considers a finite number of different tax structures, 
i Î , i˛F . First, it
calculates the optimal tax system, 
* i x , i˛
i Î , for each tax structure considered. Then, in
the second step, it chooses as the overall optimal tax system, 
* x , that of the solutions to
the maximisation problems for the different tax structures considered, which is associated
with the highest level of social welfare.
Using the expenditure function approach we specify the government's maximisation
problem for a given tax structure as the maximisation of the social welfare
function, ( ) W
12H u,u,..,u , with respect to 
H 2 1 ,..,u ,u u ;  L;  ( ) M ...,w , w1 ” w ;
( ) N M 1 M + + ” ,...,q q q ; and  ( )
k k
1
k p , p M ..., ” p , k˛A, subject to the following constraints:
1) L u E
h h - = ) , ( w q, , h˛H , which  requires lump-sum taxation to be uniform and the
levels of individual utilities to be consistent with the level of unearned income, 
h I =-L ,
for each household.
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represents the general equilibrium conditions of the economy.
8
                                                
8 For a price-tax vector to be consistent with an equilibrium situation it has to satisfy the conditions for
profit maximisation, utility maximisation and the material balances. The conditions for profit maximisation
and utility maximisation are substituted into the material balance conditions, and finally the material5
3) According to the tax structure considered, a subset of { j j / w p
k = j
kS Tj , F j   ˛ ,
A ˛ k }, which for primary factors constrains the differences between sector specific
producer prices, 
k p j , and household prices;  j w ; and { ) ( / i
M i M i c q
- - p = i T , C ˛ i   }, which
for produced commodities constrain the differences between household prices,  i q , and
producer prices (represented by unit costs, ) (
i i c p ).
3  The characterisation of the optimal tax structure
In this section we derive the conditions for the tax structure to be optimal when certain
tax rates are constrained to be the same due to the administrative costs of differentiating
the tax rates using a similar approach as in Munk (1980), but explicitly representing the
administrative costs associated with different tax structures and considering a many
household rather than a one household economy. We also briefly, as point of reference
for the subsequent analysis, characterise the optimal tax structure in the absence of
administrative costs.
As a matter of normalisation we fix the market price, 1 1 p ” , and in order to simplify the
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The Lagrangean expression corresponding to the government’s maximisation problem for
a given set of tax constraints, i.e. for a given tax structure, may then be formulated as
£ ( )
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balance conditions for the produced commodities are substituted into the material balance conditions for
the primary factors. Notice that since we consider more than one primary factor we cannot without
imposing productive efficiency incorporate the material balance conditions into the government's budget
constraint.6
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h  is the net social value of transferring income lump-sum wise from the
government to household h
j l  is the opportunity cost price of primary factor j
9
k
j g  is the social welfare cost price of the tax on the use of primary factor j in sector
k, and equal to 0 if not constrained
i g  is the social welfare cost price of the tax on the consumption of commodity i,
and equal to 0 if not constrained
The first order conditions with respect to 
H 2 1 ,..,u ,u u ;  L;  ( ) M ...,w , w1 ” w ;
( ) N M 1 M + + ” ,...,q q q ; and  ( )
k k
1
k p , p M ..., ” p , k˛A, to be satisfied by an optimal tax system
































































































































s a = 0 k˛A, s˛F   (6)
where some    i g and 
k
j g  are zero according to the tax structure considered.
10
                                                
9  1 l  may also be interpreted as the opportunity cost price of government funds.
10 The opportunity cost price of a tax constraint is not only zero when the corresponding transaction can be
taxed freely, but also when, according to tax equivalence theorems, a tax on the transaction is equivalent to
taxes on other transactions which are feasible (see Munk 1980). For example, the fact that the consumption
of only one produced commodity or the supply of only one primary factor cannot be taxed, does not in7
From (2) we obtain that the net marginal social value of a lump-sum transfer from the
government to household h may be expressed as
= y
h
1 l - m
h   h˛H    (7)
where (in analogy with the definition by Diamond 1975 for an economy without tax
restrictions) the net marginal social welfare of income for household h we defined as
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” b  is the marginal social welfare of income for household h, and
  / ~
1 l l ” j j p F ˛ j      (9)
j
F j
i p p ~ a ~ M - i
j ￿
˛
”   C i    ˛    (10)
the  opportunity cost prices of primary factors and produced commodities,  respectively.
By definition therefore  1 1
~ p p = .
From (3) we have (when a uniform lump-sum tax is feasible) that
L










We transform (4) and (5) into
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itself impose a binding constraint. Similarly, that one of the inputs in an industry cannot be taxed does not



































are  net distributional characteristics of primary factors and produced commodities,
respectively, (defined in analogy with Feldstein's 1972 distributional characteristics). We
interpreted  i d , F C¨ ˛ i   as indices of discouragement (Mirrlees 1976).
11
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Equation (14) shows that production efficiency will in general not be desirable when it is
not possible to tax all market transactions (cf. Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1971 and Munk
1980). It is difficult at the level of generality of the present model to provide an intuitive
interpretation of (14), in particular because of the complexity of the problem of
normalisation. For example, whether certain tax constraints are binding may depend on
whether certain other tax rates are restricted or not (see Munk 1980). To facilitate the task
                                                
11 The indices of discouragement provide an approximation to the reduction in compensated demand from
the first best situation where household prices are equal to producer prices to the second best situation.
Notice that the indices of discouragement here are defined for differences between household prices and
opportunity cost prices rather than the difference between household prices and producer prices.
12 -
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11s a Y l -
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By the assumption of constant returns to scale production functions and cost minimisation
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s aY l s˛F, k˛A9
of interpretation we therefore have chosen to base the analysis of the optimal tax structure
when certain tax constraints are binding based on a number of specific assumptions.
However, to provide a point of reference for the subsequent analysis we at this stage
briefly consider the optimal tax theory in the case where all market transactions may be
taxed at their optimal level.







- =0 A ˛ k    (15)
Production efficiency is thus desirable, as may be inferred from the Diamond and
Mirrlees' efficiency theorem.
When all market transactions may be taxed, we may further, as a matter of normalisation,
assume the supply of factor 1, and its use in all production sectors to be untaxed, i.e.
1 1 p w = ,  1 1 p p
k = ,  A ˛ k . Furthermore, we may choose market prices so that one
production sector is untaxed. By (9) and (10) all market prices are therefore equal to the
corresponding opportunity cost prices, i.e.
i i p p ~ = F C¨ ˛ i    (16)
In (12) and (13) we may therefore replace opportunity cost prices with market prices. The
indices of discouragement
13 thus become
( ) ( )
   





















C k ¨ ˛ F    (17)
The interpretation of this equation is well known (see for example Myles 1995). If the
government is  inequality-neutral, the indices of discouragement are the same for all
commodities (the Ramsey result), and commodities, which are complementary to leisure,
are in general taxed at relatively high rates (Corlett and Hague 1953). If both the different
types of labour and the consumption of produced commodities are separable from leisure
in utility, and homothetic in commodities and the different types of labour, respectively,
the optimal tax structure involves that incomes of different types of labour are taxed
according to the same schedule and that the consumption of the two commodities are
taxed at the same rate. If the government is inequality-averse, commodities consumed by
high-income households disproportionately relative to their income will in general be
discouraged relatively more than commodities which are consumed disproportionately by
low-income households.
                                                
13 For more details see for example Myles (1995).10
4  The optimal tax structure with administrative costs
In this section we attempt to provide intuitive explanations of how administrative costs
may influence the optimal tax structure, and more specifically when such costs may
justify production inefficiency. To facilitate the exposition we limit the number of
different cases to consider by making a number of specific assumptions. Therefore, these
assumptions do not really limit the generality of the analysis.
We assume, that the economy has two types of labour, high-skilled labour, labelled 1,
and low-skilled labour, labelled 2. Both types of labour are supplied by all households,
but in various proportions. Some households therefore have higher income than others.
14
Furthermore, we assume that each household demands two types of produced
commodities, services, labelled 3, and manufactured goods, labelled 4. Services are less
complementary to leisure than manufacturing goods, and demanded relatively more by
high-skilled households.
Finally we assume that the service industry, sector 1, is more intensive in the use of low-
skilled labour than the manufacturing industry, sector 2.
With respect to the administrative costs of different tax structures we assume,







j = ” ,  j˛F   (18)
involves lover administrative costs than taxing households at different rates;







”= ,  j˛C   (19)
involves lower administrative costs than differentiating the tax rates between
commodities; and











”= ,  j˛F ,  j˛A   (20)
                                                
14 The specification allows substitution between the two types of labour. The model may therefore be used
to represent the disincentive effects on the supply of high-skilled labour of subsidizing low-skilled labour.11
involves lower administrative costs than when inputs are taxed at different rates in the
different production sectors.
We assume that in the process of identifying the overall optimal tax system, the
government considers a tax structure,  0 î , where there are no restrictions on the
government's choice of tax rates, and the following four tax structures,
1 î ”{(S=S), T, (
11
2 (1,) T = T ), ( ) 1 , 1 (
2 = T ), 0}
15
2 î ”{(S=S), T, ( ) 1 , 1 (
1 = T , ( ) 1 , 1 (
2 = T ), 0}
3 î ”{(S=S), (T=T, ( ) , 1 (
1
2
1 T = T , ( ) 1 , 1 (
2 = T ), 0}
4 î ”{(S=S), (T=T), ( ) 1 , 1 (
1 = T ), ( ) 1 , 1 (
2 = T  ), 0}.
Notice that the tax structures,  1 î  and  3 î , allows the taxation of inputs to be differentiated
between production sectors, whereas under  2 î  and  4 î  factor inputs cannot be taxed, and
production efficiency is therefore imposed, although it may not be desirable. We assume
that all tax systems 
i x , which belong to the same tax structure, are associated with the
same administrative costs. We therefore have
B( 0
i x ˛î )> B( 1
















i x ˛î )
Finally, we make two alternative assumptions about the income distributional preferences
of the government. We assume that the government either attaches the same weight to the
changes in real income for all households, i.e. is inequality-neutral, or higher weights to
the changes in real income for low-income households than for high-income households,
i.e. is inequality-averse.
4.1  Unrestricted tax structure ( 0 î )
If the government is inequality-neutral, the indices of discouragement are the same for all
commodities, and, generally speaking, commodities that are complementary to leisure are
taxed at relatively high rates (cf. Corlett and Hague 1953). One would therefore expect
services to be taxed at a lower rate than manufactured goods, since services have been
assumed to be less complementary to leisure. Notice that if both labour and consumption
were separable from leisure, to tax income according to the same tax schedule and to tax
the consumption of the two commodities at the same rate would be the optimal solution.
                                                
15 Notice that if the government were able to tax low-skill labour in both sectors, then the restriction that the
two types of labour must be taxed at the same rate would not be binding. We would therefore obtain the
same optimal allocation as without this restriction, although with different tax rates.12
Under the assumption that the government is  inequality-averse, the net distributional
characteristics for low-skilled labour,  2
~ R , will in general be higher than for high-skilled
labour,  1
~ R . The optimal tax structure will therefore involve a lower level of
discouragement for low-skilled labour than for high-skilled labour. The tax on the supply
of low-skilled labour will therefore, in general, be lower than on the supply of high-
skilled labour, or in other words, an optimal tax system will, involve low-skilled labour
being subsidised, or, if taxed, taxed at a lower rate than high-skilled labour.
The net distributional characteristics for services,  3
~
R , are likely, since they are consumed
disproportionately by the high-skilled households, to be lower than for manufacturing
goods,  4
~ R . However, whether services will be taxed at a lower or a higher rate than
manufacturing products depend on the balancing of efficiency considerations (the
objective of discouraging the consumption of leisure, which suggest a relatively low tax
rate on services) with distributional considerations (which suggest a relatively high rate
of tax on services).
4.2  General income tax ( 1 î  and  2 î )
Under the two tax structures,  1 î  and  2 î , it is possible to tax the consumption of services
and manufactured goods at different rates, and therefore  34 gg = =0. Under  1 î , where the
use of low-skilled labour in the service industry also may be taxed, 
1
2 g =0, and also 
1
1 g =0,
because, although the use of high-skilled labour in the service industry cannot be taxed,
this constraint is not binding, since there are no restrictions on the tax on the consumption
of services.
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and under 

























C k   ˛  (23)13
The optimal levels of discouragement for low-skilled and high-skilled labour are thus
likely to be different than under  0 î .




2 t  =  2
1
2 p p - =- S
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2 s s˛F   (24)
where 
2 s  is the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labour in the
manufacturing industry, and 
2
1 a  the share of high-skilled labour. Under  1 î  by properties









2 T   F s   ˛  (25)
Were it desirable (although it is not possible) to tax the supply of low -skilled labour at a
lower rate than high-skilled labour, and therefore
2
2 g >0, then (see 24) it is desirable to tax
the use of low-skilled labour in the service industry, i.e. 
1
2 t <0. If the opposite were the
case, then
2
2 g <0 and 
1
2 t >0. In absolute terms 
1
2 t  will be the greater the smaller the use of
low-skilled labour, the smaller the cost share of high-skilled labour,
2
1 a , and the smaller
the elasticity of substitution between high and low-skilled labour,
2 s , in the
manufacturing industry.
For an  inequality-neutral government, based on the assumptions made, we may expect
» g
2
2 0, and hence (under  1 î ) that 
1
2 t »0; whereas for an  inequality-averse government,
where the supply of low-skilled labour under a unrestricted tax structure  0 î  is likely to be
taxed at a lower rate than high-skilled labour, we would expect 
1
2 t <0.
Since  1 î  imposes fewer restrictions on the government’s choice of tax instruments than
2 î , the optimal solution under  1 î , is superior to that under  2 î , if the benefits of the tax
(subsidy) on the use of low-skilled labour in the service industry is greater than the
opportunity cost value of the larger administrative costs of  1 î  compared to  2 î . Notice
however the optimal solution under  1 î  involves production inefficiency, which is not the
case under  2 î .
                                                
16 See Analytical Appendix for details on the derivation.14
4.3  A general income tax and a uniform VAT ( 3 î and  4 î )
Under  3 î and  4 î , a proportional tax structure is imposed not only on the taxation of
labour income, but also on taxation of the produced commodities (in the form of a
uniform VAT), such that  S S j = ,  j˛F, and  T Ti = ,  i˛C.
17
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C k˛  (30)
The optimal levels of discouragement are therefore likely to be different from those under
0 î  not only for the supply of low-skilled and high-skilled labour, but also for the
consumption of services and manufactured goods.
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3 î , by properties of Lagrange multipliers we have
                                                
17 In the case of  4 î , as mentioned above, only one tax system is feasible. The optimal tax system under  4 î
is therefore the same whether the government is inequality-neutral or inequality-averse.


























  C k   ˛    (34)
Were it desirable (although it is not possible) to tax the supply of low-skilled labour at a
lower rate than high-skilled labour then 
2
2 g >0, as under 1 î , and if the opposite is the case,
2
2 g <0. Furthermore, were it desirable (although it is not possible) to tax services at a
lower rate than manufactured goods, then  3 g >0 and  4 g <0; and if the opposite were the
case, then  3 g <0 and  4 g >0.
For an  inequality-neutral  government since services have been assumed to be less
complementary to leisure than manufactured goods, it is likely that 3 g >0,  4 g <0, and
» g
2
2 0. Disregarding administrative costs, the optimal solution under 
3 î  is therefore
likely to involve a subsidy to the use of low-skilled labour in the service industry, i.e.
1
2 t <0, in order to encourage the consumption services and hence leisure and thus decrease
the distortionary costs of taxation (cf. 31).
For an  inequality-averse government 
2
2 g >0, and if efficiency considerations dominate
distributional considerations with respect to the tax on the consumption of services,
then 3 g >0 and  4 g <0. Under these assumptions a subsidy to the use of low-skilled labour
is justified both on efficiency grounds and on distributional grounds, i.e.
1
2 t <0 (cf. 31).
However, if  3 g <0 and  4 g >0 (i.e. if efficiency considerations dominate with respect to the
a tax on services), then whether it will be desirable to subsidise the use of low-skilled
labour in the service industry will depend on the relative strength of a number of factors
drawing in opposite directions. These in turn depend on the share of low-skilled labour
and the elasticities of substitution in the two industries and which draw in different
directions (cf. 31). The objective of discouraging the consumption of services for
distributional reasons, conflicts in this case with the objective of encouraging it for
efficiency reasons and with the objective of supporting the income of low-skilled
households.
Finally, repeating the point made above, since  3 î imposes fewer restrictions than  4 î , the
optimal tax system under  3 î , is superior to that under  4 î  if the benefits of the tax
(subsidy) on the use of low-skilled labour in the service industry are more important than
the social value of the larger administrative costs. In this case the optimal tax system
under  3 î  dominates the optimal tax system under  4 î , although the former involves
production inefficiency and the latter does not.16
5  Ranking of the tax-transfer systems considered
5.1  Theoretical analysis
Disregarding administrative costs, the level of social welfare associated with an
optimised tax-transfer system cannot by definition decrease with the addition of an
additional tax instrument. The (partial) ranking of the tax structures considered is













whether the government is inequality neutral or inequality averse. However, in terms of












. The ranking is in other words the opposite of the ranking according
to social welfare when administrative costs are disregarded. The tax structure, which is
associated with the highest level of social welfare, cannot therefore be identified on the
basis only of theoretical considerations, but requires empirical information about the
economy and the preferences of the government. More specifically, it is thus not possible
based on theoretical considerations to say a priori whether the optimal tax system
involves production efficiency or not.
5.2  Quantitative example
To support the insight as to when production inefficiency is desirable, we have
constructed a stylised CGE model according the assumptions on which the theoretical
analysis has been based and used the model to calculate the optimal tax system for each
of the five tax structures considered. Details on the data, the functional forms, the
parameter values and the simulation results, are available in the Annex
Using the CGE model it is possible to establish a complete ranking of the tax structures
considered and to determine whether or not the optimal tax structure involves production
efficiency or not.
When the government is  inequality-neutral we get the following ranking of the tax
systems (see Column 4 in the Table)
43210 îîîîî ffff
and when the government is inequality-averse ( see Table, Column 5)
43210 îîîîî ffff.17
Table  Administrative costs and social welfare under different tax structures
Administrative
costs





















































0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: Stylised CGE model ( see Annex).
When the government is inequality-neutral, the overall optimal tax system therefore
involves production efficiency, but under the more realistic assumption that it is
inequality-averse production efficiency is not desirable.
The simulation results thus highlight that which tax structure is the optimal depends on
both the administrative costs of the different tax structures and on the government's
distributional preferences. Not only the optimal level of the tax rates, but also which tax
instruments it will be desirable to use, depends crucially on the government's
distributional value judgements.18
6  Summary and concluding remarks
We have considered an economy where different types of labour are taxed at the same
rate reflecting an almost universal feature of existing income tax systems, at least until
recently. We have analysed how both the objective of reducing the distortionary costs of
the tax system (efficiency considerations) and the objective of improving the income
distribution (equity considerations) may make it desirable to design a tax structure that
creates production inefficiency.
We have moved the analysis of the subject forward by considering a many, rather than a
one household economy identifying distributional considerations as an important reason
for why production efficiency may not be desirable. Furthermore, we have provided an
explanation of why certain tax rates are restricted by taking into account administrative
costs. How this is done may be considered as an overly simplistic way to capture the
importance of transaction cost for the design of an optimal tax structure, but so may the
assumption that lump-sum taxes are not feasible. However, in the absence of alternative
assumptions, which are both manageable in a general equilibrium framework and more
realistic, we suggest that the assumptions made concerning administrative costs, as the
assumption that lump-sum taxes are not feasible, may serve to make optimal tax theory a
more useful framework for policy analysis.
The theoretical analysis, and the simulation results generated to illustrate the theoretical
results suggest that it is likely that the optimal system of taxes under reasonable
assumptions will involve production inefficiencies, and that production efficiency, and
hence free trade should be taken as a normative benchmark for the assessment of
economic policies with more caution than is often the case.
The main lessons for policy analysis to be drawn from this paper may be summarised in
the following three points:
First, the administrative costs associated with different tax systems and with individual
tax instruments may be crucial for the design of an optimal tax structure. The
introduction of a new tax instrument may dramatically change the optimal values of other
tax instruments. Changes in administrative costs associated with a given tax instrument
may therefore not only justify its suppression or its introduction, but may also
significantly change the overall tax structure.
Second, a tax system should not be characterised as inefficient without reference to the
value judgements on which the design of the system has been based. A government with
strong redistributional preferences is likely to implement a more differentiated tax system
and one that is more likely to create production inefficiencies than a government without
redistributional objectives.
Third, social and technological developments changing the administrative costs of
taxation and the distribution of income may justify the introduction of new tax
instruments, including tax instruments that create production inefficiency. Technological19
progress, in particular in information technology, and the globalisation of the economy,
have, in industrial countries, decreased the costs of tax administration and increased the
differences in income between low-skilled and high-skilled workers. This may justify a
shift towards more differentiated tax-transfer systems in favour of the low-skilled
workers, even if a general income tax and a uniform VAT at earlier times have been the
optimal solution. The approach adopted in this paper may thus potentially serve as a
framework to assess proposals for reforms of the Welfare State.20
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Analytical Appendix
We may define the elasticity of substitution between factor 1 and 2 as
k s =
k
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When the supplies of the primary factors are taxed at the same rate as well as the
consumption of the produced commodities, and the use of primary factors in sector 2
cannot be taxed, but a tax on the use of factor 2 in sector 1 is feasible, such that 
1
2 g =0,
then for k=1 and s=2
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and for k=2 and s=2
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and under the same assumptions as above, except that the consumption of the produced
commodities may be taxed at separate rates such that  3 g =0 and  4 g =0,
2 2 p p -
1 =  - S
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Annex: The CGE model. The specification and simulation results
Specification
A) Functional forms
The following supplementary assumptions have been made:
The constant returns to scale production functions,  ) ; , ( 2 1
k k k k v v f s , are CES functions.
( )
h L h h h c C U
.
0; , s , express for each household utility as a function of the aggregate
consumption and pure leisure.  ( )
h D h h h h C C C C
.
2 1 ; , s =  express the degree of substitution
between the two composite goods, and  ) ; , (
. .
0





i c x C C s =  indicates for each
composite good the substitution possibilities between the amount purchased of the
commodity, 
h




The  utility functions,  ( )
h h z x ,
h u  are assumed to take the form
19,
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The quantities of the two composite commodities, combining services and time and the
manufactured good and time, are indicated by 
h
i C , i=1,2, respectively. For each of the
two composite commodities, a function  ) ; , (
. .
0





i c x C C s =  indicates how the
quantity purchased of the corresponding marketed commodity, 
h
i x , is combined with the
time used for its consumption, 
i..h
0 c . Each household has the same time endowment,
indicated by  0 w . The total time used to supply labour to the market is
h z0 = ) ; , (
.
2 1 0
h Z h h h z z z s , "Leisure" or "non-market use of time" is therefore  0 w -
) ; , (
.
2 1 0





0 . "Pure leisure", 
h c0 , is the amount of time used on activities that do not involve




ih h c c 0 0 0 - ) ; , (
.
2 1 0
h Z h h h z z z s .
The functions,  ( )
h L h h h c C U
.
0; , s , expresses for each household utility as a function of
aggregate consumption and pure leisure. The functions  ( )
h L h h h c C U
.
0; , s ,
                                                
19 It is important to emphasise that utility function constitutes a special case of the utility function defined
on  ( )
h h z x , u
h , on which the theoretical analysis is based. Any results derived for the theoretical model
must therefore apply to the specific CGE model.4
( )
h D h h h C C C
.
2 1 ; , s ,  ) ; , (
. 1 . 1
0 1 1
h C h h h c x C s  and  ) ; , (
. 2 . 2
0 1 2
h C h h h c x C s  are all CES functions.
20 This
specification allows household preferences defined over marketed commodities,
( )
h h z x ,
h u , to represent different degrees of complementarity with "leisure" in the
meaning non-market use of time. The supplies of high-skilled and low-skilled labour by
household h are, in efficiency units, 
h h z z 2 1   and   , respectively. The functions,
) ; , (
.
2 1 0
h Z h h h z z z s , are household specific CET transformation functions. These
transformation functions reflect differences in inherent abilities and in education between
the households, but not differences in taste. In supplying labour to the market the




The parameters of the two production functions and of the utility functions are provided
in Annex Table 1. The time used per unit of expenditures is for both households assumed
to be higher for manufactured goods than for services (see Annex Table 1). The
manufactured goods are therefore more complementary with "leisure" (i.e. non-market
use of time) than the services, (think of childcare).
The government is assumed to be either inequality-neutral (maximising aggregate real
income) or inequality-adverse (maximising a weighted sum of the real incomes of the
households). In the case of an inequality-adverse government the social welfare weight
for the low-income household has been fixed at twice that for the high-income household.
C) Benchmark data
The benchmark data set on which the CGE model is calibrated is provided in Annex
Table 2. The tax system in the benchmark consists of a 40% income tax and a VAT at
0%.
                                                
20 Often CGE models, which are based on such assumptions, are unsuited for optimal tax analysis. Often
an economy with only one type of households is considered, and labour supply is assumed either to be
fixed, or if endogenous, preferences are assumed to be homothetic with the consumption of produced goods
being separable from the consumption of leisure. These assumptions imply that a proportional tax structure
is optimal. They may for some purposes constitute a convenient simplification of reality, but may also give
rise to misleading conclusions with respect to what constitutes desirable directions of policy reform. The
specification of household preferences adopted here overcomes this problem.
21 Assuming that the supply to the market of the two types of labour  ) , ( 2 1
h h z z  is separable from composite
consumption, 
h C , and from leisure, 0 w
h z0 - , is restrictive.  It implies, in the absence of distributional
considerations, that the optimal tax structure for the two types of labour will be proportional. Notice,
however, that since  ) , ( 2 1 0 0
h h h h z z z z =  the model is able to represent the distortion of the supply of high
skilled compared to low skilled labour.5
D) Computer program
The model has been programmed in GAMS/MPSGE (see Tom Rutherford 1994,
"Applied General Equilibrium Modelling with MPSGE as a GAMS subsystem", Memo).
The program can be obtained from the author.
E)  Simulation results
The results of the calculation of the optimal solutions to the government’s maximisation
problem for five different tax structures considered are provided in Annex Table 3
Annex Table 1  Model parameters
Households
Low-skilled High-skilled
h D. s  
1) 0.50 0.50
h L. s  
2) 0.50 0.50
h Ci. s  
3) 0.00 0.00
h Z. s  
 4) 1.00 2.00
) /( 0 0 0
h h z z - w  
5) 1.67 1.00
h h x c 1
. 1
0 /  
6) 0.001 0.010
h h x c 2
. 2




k s  
8) 1.50 0.50
1) Elasticity of substitution between leisure and aggregate consumption in  ( )
h L h h h c C U
.
0; , s
2) Elasticity of substitution between household produced consumption services in  ( )
h D h h h C C C
.
2 1 ; , s
3) Elasticity of substitution between the purchase and time used in  ) ; , (
. .
0
h Ci h i h
i
h
i c x C s
4) Elasticity of transformation between high-skilled and low-skilled labour in ) ; , (
.
2 1 0
h Z h h h z z z s
5) Time for non-market use as share of time used to supply labour to the market
6) Share of time for non-market use used to consume the service commodity
7) Share of time for non-market use used to consume other commodities
8) Elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labour in  ) ; , ( 2 1
k k k k v v f s6
Benchmark values of prices, of quantities demanded and
supplied, of real incomes and of social welfare








High-skilled labour 0,60 1,00 1,00 1,00
Low-skilled labour 0,60 1,00 1,00 1,00
Services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Manufacturing 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00





Low-skilled High-skilled Services Manufacturing
High-skilled labour 3,52 152,47 2,00 90,00
Low-skilled labour 5,00      1,00 3,00  2,00
Services 0,10    4,90
Manufacturing 5,00   87,00





Low-skilled High-skilled Services Manufacturing
High-skilled labour 0,41 0,99 0,40 0,98
Low-skilled labour 0,59 0,01 0,60 0,02
Services 0,02 0,05
Manufacturing 0,98 0,95




Real income 5,11 92,08
Welfare 10,22 92,087
Simulation results
Annex Table 3.1: Optimal tax system when all market transaction can be taxed
0 î Neutral Averse
Household taxes
High-skilled labour, 40% 40%




Low-skilled labour in service industry 0% 0%
Table 3.2: Optimal tax system with a general income tax
1 î
2 î
Neutral Averse Neutral Averse
Household taxes
High-skilled labour, 40% 40% 40% 40%
Low-skilled labour, 40% 40% 40% 40%
Services, -16% -10% -13% -32%
Manufacturing, 1% 3% 1% 2%
Producer taxes
Low-skilled labour in service industry 10% -50%
Table 3.3: Optimal tax system with a general income tax and a VAT
3 î
4 î
Neutral Averse Neutral Averse
Household taxes
High-skilled labour, 40% 40% 40% 40%
Low-skilled labour, 40% 40% 40% 40%
Services, 0% 3% 0% 0%
Manufacturing, 0% 3% 0% 0%
Producer taxes
Low-skilled labour in service industry -0.1% -50% 
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